I think your point is quite valid, I would definitely read books on several of your list. I think the lack of bios on some people comes down to sales potential and amount of source material. The fanatics would eagerly pick up a bio on a lesser known figure, whereas the masses are more likely to pick up the 100th bio on Sherman. Of your list the one book I can recommend is "Tennessee's Forgotten Warriors" which is about Cheatham and his division, if you have not seen that one. I enjoyed reading that one. Humphreys has his memoir From Gettysburg to the Rapidan but there is no objective bio on him that I have aware of.

The Shea/Hess Pea Ridge book is the best book on the battle I have read, it was very detailed. The Van Dorn bio was good as well. Another related work is "Ben McCulloch and the Frontier Military Tradition". It gives a lot of insight into his personality and also makes it not very surprising he ran into personality conflicts with other generals.

I read Burton, I liked it. He is critical of Mac but also of Lee in how Lee coordinated his command during the campaign. I have not read the Kearny Letters. I would be interested in what you think of that one once you read it.

I think the Seven Days is under-appreciated, though I do not think ultimate victory was super close. Simply seizing the capital does not end the war in my mind, Grant and Lincoln both realized this late in the war. They would have had to destroy the army in my mind, not just seize Richmond. The Americans lost their capital in the Revolution but kept fighting. I think by the time of the conclusion of the battle of Seven Pines the momentum had changed, and McClellan was at a point where he was believing the inflated troop number estimates he was receiving. I think those numbers combined with not receiving McDowell's Corps took the wind out of his sails, the fighting spirit was gone. The potential for an assault on Richmond was there, particularly if McClellan would have struck at Richmond while Porter was holding the line on the opposite side of the Chickahominy during the battle of Mechanicsville. Magruder likely could not have held up against a determined assault in front of Richmond. But how far things would have gone it is really tough to say. If guys like Hooker and Kearny had their way they would have likely at least taken a shot. It is interesting to consider the possibilities.

I read the Mingus book a couple of years ago, I did not find it particularly notable. There is nothing wrong with the book, it is a quick read. But it is not a real action packed period, so writing a compelling narrative would be rather difficult in my opinion.

There is some debate regarding Rodes on the 3rd. In the only other book I have read on Rodes by Collins, there is a description of the 3rd, which includes Rodes describing his orders: "were general, and the same as those of the day before, and accordingly, when the heavy cannonade indicated that another attack was made from the right wing of our army, we were on the lookout for another favorable opportunity to cooperate." Rodes' report is clear: he was not briefed on the specifics of the attack against the Federal center, and was unsure whether he was to directly cooperate, and if so, when such cooperation was expected. "When the sound of musketry was heard, it became apparent that the enemy in our front was much excited," he observed. "The favorable opportunity seemed to me close at hand." Rodes reached the rather remarkable conclusion that the time had arrived to launch his own attack. "I sent word to Lieutenant-General Ewell by Major [H. A.] Whiting, of my staff, that in a few moments I should attack, and immediately had my handful of men, under Doles, Iverson, and Ramseur, prepared for the onset," he wrote in his report, "but in less than five minutes after Major Whiting's departure, before the troops on my immediate right had made any advance or showed any preparation therefor, and just as the order forward was about to be given to my line, it was announced, and was apparent to me, that the attack had already failed." But another author writing on the topic may uncover some different material or describe it differently.

I think that is a solid list. I have read the first 4, but not the Generals in Bronze book, that sounds interesting. If you like the McDonough Sherman book and are interested in other Western theater battles, I can also recommend McDonough's Five Tragic Hours: The Battle of Franklin, War in Kentucky, and Stones River - Bloody Winter in Tennessee if you have not come across those previously.

@Mare The best bio on Hill is Lee's Maverick General by Hal Bridges, it is based on a lot of primary source material. I assess Hill as someone who had no filter and was undone more by his inability to maintain relationships than by his battlefield service. A great quote from Bridges from Hill is "It is unfortunate to have views different from the rest of mankind. It secures abuse." In his OR about Malvern Hill, he wrote "So far as I can learn none of our troops drew trigger, except McLaws' division, mine, and a portion of Huger's. Notwithstanding the tremendous odds against us and the blundering management of the battle we inflicted heavy loss upon the Yankees." It is going to be difficult to maintain relationships when you are that blunt. But it makes for a fun read. I thought he did well with what he had at South Mountain, fought hard at Antietam and probably done better at Chickamauga had the overall leadership structure not been a complete disaster. Hill was on top of the problems with how the Confederates were lined up on the 20th before the attacks began.

@Michael Harrison Grose Brown does not indicate what he considers to be a bigger turning point in the East or in the war as a whole. The statement was made at the conclusion of the book, but to me it feels like a bit of an unfinished statement or argument. Looking at Brown's other works I don't see a focus on other significant battles, so I am not able to guess what his opinion might be. The only other book of his that I have read is the Alonzo Cushing bio, Cushing of Gettysburg.

@Mare At this stage I would suspect this will remain a mystery forever. Conspiracy or a cover-up is of course a possibility. D.H. Hill certainly went to lengths after the war to clear his name, and he was well connected doing some publishing after the war and being in contact with a lot of veterans. If something could be dug up I suspect he would have found it. Once he was able to produce his original copy from Stonewall Jackson it at least told his side of the story. If anyone maintained the secret it would be a single staff officer, and maybe someone like Lee himself if he knew who carried the order. I would not expect Lee to have come out and smeared the staff officer if he knew, and the staffer certainly never came forward.

You make good points. There is a lot to explore here, though perhaps part of the reason this area has not been pursued more is a lack of primary source material. There are some exceptions for staff officers like Horace Porter under Grant and Moxley Sorrel under Longstreet. But where is the staff officer account of what really happened to Special Orders 191, or other critical events? Without good source material we end up left with a lot of these famous "what ifs".

I am not familiar with that work, sounds like a book I might like. For the Fort Fisher portion of the campaign, I like Confederate Goliath: The Battle of Fort Fisher by Rod Gragg. The book describes the campaign well and gives insight into the leadership dynamics on both sides including Lamb, Whiting, Bragg and Hebert for the Confederates and Butler, Porter, and Terry for the Federals. Both sides experienced difficulties with their command structure and relationships which hindered their efforts. Colonel Lamb shines through in his efforts to fortify and his ultimately unsuccessful efforts to defend the fort. For the action at Goldsboro and the battle at Wise's Forks I like "To Prepare for Sherman's Coming". This is a bit of a niche study focusing primarily on the multi-day engagement at Wise's Forks. But it highlights how powerful and important it was for the Federals to advance on multiple fronts. Cox moving up towards Goldsboro, combined with Kilpatrick's cavalry, and Sherman's two main army wings moving through North Carolina left Johnston in a tremendously difficult spot. Johnston ultimately chose to move his critical limited reinforcements towards Goldsboro, which meant those troops were not available to slow Sherman around Fayetteville or prior to Averasboro.

Dilger's battery was definitely in a bad spot there. The Bachelder Day 1 map shows the precarious position out in front and facing Ewell's Corps bearing down on them. As I understand it Dilger was able to execute a fighting withdrawal buying time for the rest of the line to re-form. And this was after his service at Chancellorsville where he would later receive the Medal of Honor.

I enjoyed the episode, though my experience with it was different than the majority of the episodes. As I mentioned in my recent review of The Assassin's Accomplice on the forum Booth is not an area I have studied frequently. I have read much more about the battles and campaigns, military personalities, etc. So this episode made me think a bit and was a thoughtful discussion. Beyond the specific topic of the episode though, there is a important take-away in my opinion that should not be overlooked and that is to study what you want to study, learn about all areas, do not be afraid to tackle a difficult or uncomfortable subject. Your interest in a subject is not wrong, and we should be able to have open dialog about all subjects. History is not my profession, I am a complete amateur at this, but I believe it is important to promote inclusiveness and discussion of everything, real history is going to make you uncomfortable at times but that is ok, that is how we learn.

This is an interesting topic, and not something I have personally seen specific studies on. However, as you have indicated the roles of staff officers can be significant in the success or failure of their generals both overall and even within specific battles. We can also see the role of staff officers for Rosecrans at Chickamauga with the fatal orders to General Wood. Despite the significance of the role there are also a number of examples of senior generals that have friends or family members on their staff. Meade has his son to his right in the photo here.

Cool picture. Agree it has to be a late photo. Andrew Hickenlooper, to Blair's right, is wearing a Brigadier's star and he did not get a star until March of 1865.

That is a cool photo. Those would most likely be the members of Sherman's personal staff at the end of the war, probably right after the parade in Washington. The man on the right with the full beard is not Howard. I'm guessing, but the photo probably includes the main members of his staff like Lewis Dayton, James McCoy, Joseph Audenreid and John Hammond. Dayton may be the second or third from left https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/17896783/lewis-mulford-dayton Audenreid could be fifth from the left https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/15956438/joseph-crain-audenried I think Hammond is on the far right https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/38578990/john-henry-hammond Someone else may have a better identification of the photo though.

Masonic incidents seem to come up fairly frequently in the Atlanta and Carolinas campaigns. This is discussed in the Book Club book Through the Heart of Dixie, although it is also questioned how many of the incidents actually occurred. I did come across an incident recently while reading Sherman's Horsemen by David Evans, an account of the Federal cavalry operations late in the Atlanta campaign. A Georgian, Emily Bennett was having her house ransacked by Federal troopers, when she went outside, "raised her hand over her head and made the Masonic sign of distress three times. A tall Yankee officer came across the road and saluted. "Madame," he asked, "what can I do for you?" "My son and my husband are in Virginia fighting the war," Mrs. Bennett explained. "I am here with six daughters and a young son. I want my home cleared and protected." The officer purposefully strode through the gate, past the trampled flowerbeds, and mounted the front porch. "Out of the house," he demanded. The scavengers looked at him blankly. "Out, or your life," he roared."

In my opinion the key considerations in that scenario would be: 1. Could Longstreet resolve the command dissension in the Army of Tennessee? The AoT was a viper pit, of those wanting Bragg removed, Johnston was likely the most favored successor. Davis had also mentioned to Polk that part of the reason he sustained Bragg at this time is because he lacked confidence in Johnston, Beauregard and Longstreet. If being put in place after Chickamauga Longstreet would have been faced with potential Corps commanders like Hardee, Polk, D.H. Hill and Breckinridge. Longstreet and Hill were not best of friends, but they agreed Bragg needed to go. Longstreet was senior to the other Lieutenant Generals, Hardee and Polk, so perhaps they would have agreed to stay on. Organizing this group into a cohesive striking force though would have been a challenge for anyone up to and including R.E. Lee. Longstreet did though show some difficulty in the question of command cohesion during the Knoxville campaign, falling out with several key subordinates including McLaws, Roberston and Law following the battle. 2. Could Longstreet plan and implement and offensive operation at Chattanooga, or subsequently in the Dalton area? Longstreet's limited operations acting independently like Knoxville or the Suffolk campaign are not tremendously inspiring. Though he did demonstrate significant offensive capabilities as a subordinate commander at Chickamauga, the second day of the Wilderness and Second Manassas. But taking that next step to be the overall commander can be a big leap as demonstrated by what happened to Hooker, Burnside, Pope and others. With Grant, Sherman and Federal reinforcements pouring into Chattanooga the challenge was becoming more significant by the day. Overall it is an interesting consideration, perhaps he could have pulled it all together and been more successful than Johnston, though like all of these what-ifs it is so difficult to make a real determination.

Looking through the Official Reports I noticed the quote below from General Geary commander of a division in the XX Corps in Slocum's wing. It provides another relevant comparison of the Carolinas campaign to the March to the Sea. "The Carolina campaign, although in its general military features of the same nature as that from Atlanta to Savannah, was one of much greater labor, and which tested most thoroughly the power of endurance and elasticity of spirit among American soldiers. The distance marched was much farther, through regions presenting greater natural obstacles, and where a vindictive enemy might naturally be expected in force sufficient to harass our troops and interfere frequently with our trains. The season was one of comparative inclemency, during which the roads were in the worst condition, yet my command marched from Savannah to Goldsborough without serious opposition, and without a single attack upon the trains under my charge. The spirit of my troops throughout was confident and buoyant, expressive of that implicit trust in their commander-in-chief, and belief in themselves, which are always presages of military success."